IN SUPPORT OF REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN MAGHABERRY

On Friday, July 14, 2006 Republican POWs both in Maghaberry and Portlaoise held a 24-hour fast in protest against the regime in Maghaberry and the attempts to criminalise Republican prisoners by enforcing sub-standard conditions on the segregated landings. Republican POWs in Maghaberry have been engaged in a prison protest since June 19, 2006 and there are now over thirty POW’s on the protest.

They are fighting to improve conditions for segregated prisoners in Maghaberry who are in effect being punished for exercising their right to segregation from non-political prisoners. They are demanding that their five demands be addressed.

1. RIGHT TO FREE ASSOCIATION
2. END TO CONTROLLED MOVEMENT
3. RIGHT TO FULL TIME EDUCATION
4. SEPARATE VISITING FACILITY
5. RIGHT TO ORGANISE OUR OWN LANDINGS

POWs in Portlaoise have been acting in solidarity with their comrades in Maghaberry during the prison protest and 19 POWs in Portlaoise took part in the fast.

The Plough
Volume 3, Number 29
30 July 2006

Press Release/Preas Ráiteas

Republican Prisoners’ Action Group

Maghaberry Protest Continues

Republican POWs in Maghaberry Gaol will embark upon a 24-hour fast from Noon on Thursday (July 27) until Noon on Friday (July 28) as part of their ongoing protest for political status.

Their demands include the right to free association; an end to controlled movement; the right to full-time education; segregated visits, and the right to organise their own wing.

Whilst political status was signed away by agents of the English government under the terms of the Stormont Agreement, the Republican Prisoners’ Action Group (RPAG) asserts that it remains the right of Republican POWs. The RPAG calls on the Irish people to support the just demands of the POWs!

ENDS

 

ENDS

Republican Prisoners’ Action Group

Submission to NIPS (Northern Ireland Prison Service) Consultation on Review of Separated Prisoners at Maghaberry Gaol

1. Republican Prisoners’ Action Group (RPAG)

1.1. RPAG is a non-governmental organisation formed to lobby on behalf of Republican prisoners. The group works closely with Republican prisoners, their families and political representatives.

1.2. RPAG was not consulted in the NIPS consultation on the review of the separated regime in Maghaberry Gaol. RPAG request that the group is consulted in any future consultations regarding separated prisoners.

2. Scope of Present Consultation

2.1. As stated above RPAG has not previously been consulted in the current process. It would also appear that no body dealing directly with Republican prisoners currently detained in Maghaberry Gaol has been consulted. Neither Republican Sinn Fein nor the Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association were not approached in the consultation process.

2.2. We note with concern that comments are only elicited by the NIPS in respect of a limited number of the recommendations of the review. We have not sought to limit this submission to the limited request for comments, but ask that this submission is fully considered.

3. Deficiencies in Review

3.1. The review does not address the fundamentally political nature of the imprisonment of Republican prisoners. We submit that until the political nature of Republican prisoners is acknowledged that any attempt to impose an appropriate regime will fail to meet the rights and needs of these prisoners.

3.2. The NIPS and the British government has had a protracted history of conflict with Republican prisoners. It is clear that the NIPS is not in a sufficiently independent position to be able to conduct this review or address this fundamental issue.

3.3. The vast majority of prison officers are from the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community. The inherent difficulties that such a body would have in implementing an impartial and independent regime in respect of Republican political prisoners is not recognised in the review.

3.4. RPAG calls for an independent and international review into the conditions of detention of Republican prisoners at Maghaberry Gaol.

3.5. RPAG calls for the implementation of measures to address the overwhelming imbalance in the religious and political background of prison officers in the NIPS.

4. Core Principles

4.1. We have serious concerns in relation to aspects of the ‘core principles’ as outlined in the review.

4.2. We submits that public confidence is not a valid consideration when considering the rights of separated prisoners. The primary concern must be to respect the rights of those involved and that the Service must not bow to extraneous public opinion. Confidence in the administration of justice should in any event flow from respecting fundamental rights and equality and treating prisoners with dignity and humanity.

4.3. NIPS has included in its core criteria that “separated prisoners should not benefit from a markedly better regime than their integrated counterpart”. This indicates an approach likely to result in separated prisoners being provided with a less favourable regime than the integrated population. RPAG is concerned that no counter balance is included in the core principles to state that separated prisoners should not be offered a markedly worse regime than their integrated counterparts.

4.4. The core principle dealing with the alleged risk of subversion is clearly based on a subjective analysis of the situation. We submit that this discloses a biased approach to the review in this regard. The NIPS “experience” in this regard is clearly tainted by a political view that seeks to restrict the rights of Republican prisoners.

4.5. While maintenance and good order of the prison are clearly matters within the remit of the NIPS we submit that elevating concerns of subversion to the level of a “core principle” is likely to pre-determine the result of any review.

4.6. We submit that the above demonstrates further supports its calls for an independent and international review.

4.7. RPAG calls on the NIPS to review its “core principles” and to remove irrelevant and subjective references.

4.8. RPAG calls on the NIPS to respect international standards of detention and international human rights law and not to permit themselves to be influenced by extraneous political or populist influences.

5. Background

5.1. Separation was introduced solely on the grounds of safety. It is clear that Republican prisoners were the only prisoners whose safety was compromised in the operation of the integrated regime in Maghaberry Gaol. While references were made in the Steele report of a need to avoid a return to the conditions which existed in Long Kesh Gaol the report was not prescriptive as to how this was to be achieved.

6. Selection Criteria

6.1. We submit that the current selection criteria are vague and unworkable and we welcome the opportunity for clarity and change in this regard.

6.2. RPAG however has serious concerns in respect of the proposed new criteria.

6.3. The proposed criterion that a prisoner is to be a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland is seriously flawed. Membership or support of a proscribed organisation is contrary to British law and punishable by imprisonment.

6.4. Only a properly constituted court of law can determine whether a person is a member of a proscribed organisation. We submit that using this as a criterion is unworkable. We submit that the use of this criterion could have serious legal effects for prisoners applying for separation. The concerns are considerably greater in respect of remand prisoners who have not been convicted of any offence.

6.5. We submit that the potential adverse legal effect could have a deterrent effect on prisoners whose safety and security may nevertheless be compromised by being detained in the integrated prison population.

6.6. RPAG reminds the NIPS that the separation of prisoners is carried out on safety grounds and submit that the criteria should include an obligation on the Secretary of State to remove a prisoner from the integrated population who has made an application if there is cause to believe that his safety would be compromised.

6.7. We submit that the seven day timeframe is not sufficiently quick to ensure the safety and security of prisoners at all times. We see no reason why an application cannot be considered promptly as part of the initial reception process.

6.8. The Secretary of State is not sufficiently independent to assess applications for separation. As a member of the British government the Secretary of State is open to bring political factors into his consideration of any application.

6.9. The PSNI and other intelligence and security agencies which will no doubt inform the Secretary of State are not likely to provide an independent fair and accurate assessment of an applicant’s situation.

6.10. The provision for the Secretary of State to have regard to “such material as he considers relevant and credible” is vague.

6.11. We submit that as a matter of procedural fairness that prisoners should have the right to access and comment upon any material relied upon by the Secretary of State which is adverse to their application for separation.

6.12. We submit that separated prisoners possess useful information and perspectives in respect of the application process and it would be appropriate for them to consulted in any application for separation.

6.13. RPAG calls on the NIPS to review the criteria for selection to the separated regime.

6.14. RPAG calls on the NIPS to remove the criterion requiring an applicant to be a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

6.15. RPAG calls for the appointment of an independent and international body such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to consider applications for separation.

6.16. RPAG calls on prisoners to be given access to material which is considered adverse to their application for separation.

6.17. RPAG calls on existing separated prisoners to be consulted in respect of applications for separation.

6.18. RPAG calls on the NIPS to expedite the process of selection.

7. Security

7.1. The review appears to have at the outset ruled out major change to the search strategy and practice. This would appear to indicate a closed mind to the issue.

7.2. From the statistics provided by the NIPS in the review it can be seen that out of the 48 finds that only 3 related to finds in Roe House where Republican prisoners are located. We submit that this discloses a fundamental difference between Republican and Loyalist prisoners that ought to be reflected in developing relevant policy.

8. Strip Searching

8.1. We cannot agree with the assertion that a prisoner is never naked during a full search. While it is generally the case that during a full search a prisoner is first asked to remove his upper garments and then subsequently his lower garments it is evident that during the search that a prisoner is naked (either from the waste down or from the waste up). While the prisoner’s lower garments are being searched the prisoner’s genitals are exposed. We submit that use of strip searching is humiliating.

8.2. We understand that the strip search procedure is used considerably less frequently within the integrated prison population.

8.3. We have been informed by prisoners of cases where individual prisoners are singled out for a significantly increased number of searches.

8.4. We have also been advised of full searches which do not appear to have been recorded in accordance with Prison Service Orders. Failure to accurately record searches undermines the effectiveness of the monitoring process and the transparency of the search regime.

8.5. We submit that the use of strip searching is unnecessary, disproportionate and contrary to international standards of detention and international human rights law.

8.6. We note with concern the recommendation of the review that a facility for strip searching be purpose built on the landings. We are concerned that this will encourage further use of strip searching.

8.7. RPAG calls on the NIPS to desist from its practise of strip searching.

8.8. RPAG calls on the NIPS to ensure that any searches conducted are conducted respecting prisoners’ dignity and are only used when necessary and proportionate.

8.9. In the event that strip searching continues RPAG calls for the enforcement of the Prison Service Orders requirements for recording searches and calls on the NIPS to publish statistics on searching regularly to ensure transparency.

8.10. To avoid potential discrimination RPAG calls for the NIPS to initiate an Equality Impact Assessment of the search policy in conjunction with the Equality Commission and other international and national bodies.

9. Rub Down Searches

9.1. We welcome the recommendation that the current policy of excessive rub down searches to be discontinued.

10. Cell Searches

10.1. The review does not give any justification for the decision not to permit prisoners to be present during cell searches. The presence of prisoners at a cell search provides essential scrutiny over the search process.

10.2. We have been made aware of regular searches in which items of prisoners have been damaged.

10.3. We are particularly concerned at searches reported to RPAG where items and in particular newspapers of a political nature have been damaged or removed from prisoners’ cells. The removal of political items especially newspapers is a serious breach of the right to free association and expression of political opinion and constitutes discrimination contrary to international legal principles.

10.4. RPAG calls on the NIPS to permit prisoners to be present during cell searches.

10.5. RPAG calls on the NIPS to respect Republican prisoners’ rights to freedom of association and expression of political opinion.

11. Drugs Dog

11.1. Republican prisoners have raised repeated concerns that the use of the drugs dog is unnecessary, ineffective and used without any effective independent scrutiny.

11.2. Reference in the review to the drugs dog are only made in respect of the visiting regime and in cell searches. The NIPS will be aware that the drugs dog is also used on prisoners returning from periods of temporary release.

11.3. The evidence obtained by the NIPS themselves discloses that the misuse of drugs is not an issue which affect Republican prisoners. This has been the case throughout the history of Republican prisoners. The use of drugs dogs in respect of Republican prisoners and their visitors would therefore appear unnecessary. The fact that visitors to Republican prisoners continue to be stopped by the drugs dogs raises further questions as to the integrity of the drugs dog system.

11.4. The effectiveness of the drugs dogs is clearly called into question. There are no further searches conducted on visitors who are indicated by the dog and therefore their contact with drugs cannot be confirmed. Likewise it is clear that drugs are being smuggled into the prison by Loyalists and integrated prisoners. The opportunity for innocent contamination during the visitors’ reception process leaves open the distinct possibility of false positive indications by the dog.

11.5. There is no independent scrutiny over the drugs dog procedure. This leaves the system open to potential abuse. Visitors are unaware of exactly how the dog allegedly shows a positive indication and is unable to question the prison officers’ judgment in the matter.

11.6. The blanket policy of refusing open visits when stopped by the dog leads to an arbitrary system that does little to discourage visitors from attempting to introduce drugs into the prison.

11.7. The other security arrangements provided for visitors, ie CCTV monitoring, personal monitoring by staff and the opportunity for further searches allow for a fairer and more effective system.

11.8. It is clearly unfair that when one visitor is stopped by the dog that the whole group is prevented from proceeding with an open visit. We reject the justification raised in the review. Should a visitor be able to heavily contaminate himself or herself to distract the dog, this raises further concerns about the effectiveness of the entire system. In any event we reiterate the position that drugs are not an issue that effect Republican prisoners.

11.9. We have has similar concerns in relation to the use of the drugs dogs on prisoners returning from periods of temporary release. We submit that use of Rule 32 to restrict a prisoners’ association for a period of 48 hours is wholly disproportionate especially given the evidence that Republican prisoners have demonstrated that they are not involved with the introduction of drugs into the prison. We are unaware of any case where the use of Rule 32 has subsequently resulted in the finding of drugs on a prisoner returning from a period of temporary release.

11.10. We have similar concerns in relation to the use of the drugs dog in cell searches.

11.11. RPAG calls on the NIPS to confirm that they do not consider Republican prisoners at risk of introducing drugs to the prison.

11.12. RPAG calls on the use of the drugs dog to be discontinued.

11.13. RPAG calls on the use of closed visits to be discontinued.

11.14. RPAG calls on the use of Rule 32 on prisoners returning from temporary release to be discontinued.

11.15. Alternatively RPAG calls for the introduction of recorded CCTV footage of the drugs dog to provide effective and independent scrutiny over the process.

11.16. Given the lack of current scrutiny RPAG calls on the NIPS to conduct an equality impact assessment on the use of the drugs dog in conjunction with the Equality Commission and other international and national bodies.

12. Controlled Movement

12.1. The Steele report indicated that a return to the conditions previously existing at Long Kesh should be avoided. The conditions currently in place at Maghaberry Gaol can in no way be compared to the conditions at Long Kesh where prisoners had 24 hour unlock and control of the wings. Prisoners in Maghaberry are locked up for up to 23 hours a day and are not permitted to be on landing more than three at a time. We respectfully submits that the two situations are at the opposite extremes of detention practice.

12.2. The NIPS appear to have a fear that even small relaxations in the regime could constitute a gradual slip towards Long Kesh conditions. We respectfully submit that this idea is unfounded and irrational. This approach is unnecessarily preventing serious consideration by NIPS to removing the overly restrictive controls on movement which have been implemented.

12.3. Periods of unlock and association with other prisoners are instrumental in breaking the monotony of prison life and are necessary to ensure that the psychiatric and psychological effect of detention is not aggravated unnecessarily. The NIPS review does not appear to have considered the potential psychological effect of “controlled movement” on the separated prisoners.

12.4. Periods of free association with other prisoners is a fundamental right of political prisoners. It is noted that free association on landings throughout the integrated prison appears to work without serious security issues.

12.5. It is a widely accepted international legal principle that the only rights which a prisoner loses are those necessarily lost by his incarceration. We submit that the system of “controlled movement” currently in place in Maghaberry Gaol is unnecessary and contrary to international legal standards of detention.

12.6. While it is accepted that there does not exist any comparable prison regime with the UK it is concerning that comparisons have been made in the review with the SSU regime in England. The SSU regime has been heavily criticised by human rights groups and international bodies concerned with the prevention of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

12.7. The decision to separate Republican prisoners was taken solely on safety grounds. A regime comparable to the SSU regime was not deemed necessary prior to separation and we submit that it has not been demonstrated by NIPS that it is necessary now.

12.8. It is clear that separated prisoners are being treated less favourably than integrated prisoners in this respect. There are a wide range of alternative security measures available to the Prison Service which would enable the provision of a regime comparable to the integrated prison population. We submit that the difference in treatment cannot be justified and constitutes discrimination.

12.9. RPAG calls on the NIPS to implement a regime that respects the rights of Republican prisoners to associate freely with one another.

12.10. RPAG calls on the NIPS to implement a regime that does not treat them less favourably than the integrated prison population.

12.11. RPAG calls on the NIPS to respect international human rights standards and to protect the physical and mental integrity of Republican prisoners.

13. Regime

13.1. RPAG does not accept that the regime as published in the review is accurate. Republican prisoners often spend up to 23 hours in their cells.

14. Meals in Cell

14.1. We do not accept that there is any justification for refusing to permit Republican prisoners from eating communally. We submit that the current practice constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to international human rights law. We submit that the practice is contrary to health and safety principles.

14.2. RPAG calls on the NIPS to permit prisoners to eat together in a humane and social fashion.

15. Availability of Exercise

15.1. Republican prisoners welcome the proposed extension of exercise space and extra showers. We are however concerned that the exact details of the expansion have not been made available in the review and are concerned that the extension may still fall short of an acceptable standard.

15.2. RPAG calls on the NIPS to make available the details of the proposed extension available.

16. Constructive activity

16.1. We welcome the recognition by NIPS that it is under an obligation to offer all prisoners constructive roles and activities. However we are concerned that the contents of the Prison (Northern Ireland) Rules (Amendment) Order 2004 introduced specifically as a result of the introduction of separation do not reflect this obligation.

16.2. In particular the Order specifically purports to remove the right of separated prisoners to spend their time constructively.

16.3. RPAG calls on the British government to amend the 2004 Order to bring it into line with international standards of detention.

17. Education

17.1. As well as the inherently fundamental function of education in the general population education has historically played an important role in respect of political prisoners in Ireland. Republican prisoners especially have demonstrated a dedicated commitment to education. It has been clearly shown that education assists in conflict resolution and is crucial in the political and personal development of Republican prisoners.

17.2. Republican prisoners raised serious concerns with RPAG that when the separated regime was first implemented that the educational facilities available were minimal.

17.3. However we recognise that moves have been made since the implementation of the regime to increase the level of education available to Republican prisoners. However the level of education available has not yet reached an acceptable level or a level comparable to that available to integrated prisoners.

17.4. We reiterate the importance of distance learning courses to facilitate education that cannot be provided through the normal prison education system. We seek clarification that access to distance learning will be facilitated upon request and will not be restricted unnecessarily. We support calls from prisoners that self-education materials are provided such as text books and white-boards.

17.5. It is acknowledged that Irish language classes are offered and have been expanded. However we have concerns in relation to wider cultural educational facilities such as access to Irish political and musical materials.

17.6. We are informed by prisoners that the selection of books in the library is poor and that the stated request system is not seriously entertained by the Prison Service in particular when the subject matter touches political or Irish cultural issues.

17.7. RPAG calls on the NIPS to provide a level of educational facilities at least comparable to that provided to the integrated prison population and that will enable Republican prisoners to continue their historical commitment to education.

17.8. RPAG calls on the NIPS to ensure that educational facilities and resources are provided without restriction based on political or cultural values.

17.9. RPAG calls on the NIPS to conduct an Equality Impact Assessment in relation to the Educational facilities offered in conjunction with the Equality Commission and other international and national bodies.

18. Crafts

18.1. There are similar concerns that restrictions on crafts are based on political and cultural sensitivities of prison officers. We submit that this is in an improper approach and that any restriction on the production of overtly political craftwork would constitute discrimination on grounds of political opinion.

18.2. RPAG calls on the NIPS to ensure that craft facilities are provided without restriction based on political or cultural values.

18.3. RPAG calls on the NIPS to conduct an Equality Impact Assessment in relation to the issue of production of political crafts in conjunction with the Equality Commission and other international and national bodies.

19. Regime levels and Discipline

19.1. The review notes “there have been no serious incidents or disturbances within Bush and Roe House since separation”. We submit that this cannot solely be attributed to the control procedures and that Republican prisoners in particular have demonstrated that they are able to maintain a level of behaviour commensurate with their political status.

19.2. We submit that the introduction of a regime system for Republican prisoners is wholly unnecessary.

19.3. We reiterate our earlier submission in relation to the absence of drugs from the Republican landings. Republican prisoners do not accept the need for drugs testing to be implemented for Republican prisoners.

19.4. We have concerns in relation to the existing disciplinary procedures introduced in the Prison (Northern Ireland) Rules (Amendment) Order 2004. The Order re-introduced the availability of an award of loss of remission as a punishment for separated prisoners. We do not accept that extra disciplinary powers are necessary for Republican prisoners and submit that the introduction of the powers solely for separated prisoners constitutes potential discrimination.

19.5. We have further serious concerns in relation to the powers given to Prison Service in Section 13 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004 to transfer prisoners to prison establishments outside Ireland. We submit that any forced transfer of an Irish Republican prisoner to a prison in the United Kingdom would constitute a serious breach of international standards of detention and international human rights law.

19.6. RPAG calls on the additional powers contained in the Prison Rules and the Justice Act to be removed.

20. Visits

20.1. We have already raised our concerns in relation to the use of the passive drugs dogs at visits.

20.2. Republican prisoners also have serious concerns in relation to the bio-metric system implemented recently for visitors to Maghaberry Gaol. The retention and access to personal data of visitors by prison staff and associated civilian workers poses a security risk in particular given the history of proven allegations of links between individual prison officers and Loyalist paramilitaries. Republican prisoners have no confidence in the procedures which seek to reduce any security risk which exists. We submit that the system is an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with visitors right to privacy.

20.3. We welcome the recommendation of an introduction of a van to transport prisoners to legal visits in a secure manner. This has been a demand of Republican prisoners for some considerable time and we are concerned that it has taken this length of time to effect a policy which is instrumental in providing a safe and secure environment for prisoners.

20.4. We welcome the prospect of expanding the provision of visits for political representatives. However extending the facility only to councillors could be overly restrictive. As the NIPS will no doubt be aware Irish Republicans do not accept British sovereignty over any part of Ireland and are opposed to participating in any form of government that does not stem from the will of the Irish people acting as an independent and sovereign nation. This belief currently precludes Irish Republicans from acting as councillors, MLAs or MPs. We submits that a similar arrangement as proposed for elected political representatives be implemented for Republican political organisations which do not necessarily participate in the electoral process. We specifically submit that this facility be extended to members of Republican Sinn Fein as a long established political organisation clearly representing the interests of Republican prisoners.

20.5. We submit that an extension of the political visits should also be introduced for prison welfare organisations. RPAG submit that these groups provide invaluable services for prisoners and their families providing advice and support often analogous with that provided by legal representatives. We submit that it would be appropriate for such groups to be afforded similar visiting rights to solicitors.

20.6. We repeat calls from prisoners for the resumption of private visit to facilitate family and marital relationships and also in the event of a family death.

20.7. RPAG calls on the NIPS to discontinue the use of the drugs dog on visitors.

20.8. RPAG calls on the NIPS to discontinue the use of the current bio-metric system

20.9. RPAG calls on the NIPS to implement political visits for Irish Republican political organisations and in particular to implement political visits for Republican Sinn Fein.

20.10. RPAG calls on the NIPS to implement prison welfare visits for prisoner welfare groups and in particular requests that RPAG be permitted such visits.

21. Temporary Release

21.1. The issue of temporary release was not covered in the review. Temporary release and the maintenance of family ties is an important human rights and equality issue and one that should be considered central to the implementation of any prison regime.

21.2. RPAG is aware of a number of cases of Republican prisoners being refused periods of temporary release despite a clear absence of any risk of absconding or of breaching conditions of temporary release.

21.3. It is generally accepted that Republican prisoners have a long history of honouring conditions of temporary release.

21.4. The existing Prison Service temporary release schemes do not adequately permit prisoners to maintain family ties in the early years of their sentence. We submit that this period of time is particularly crucial in ensuring that the effects of imprisonment on the prisoner and on his family and children may have are minimised.

21.5. The use of the general discretion in Rule 27 of the Prison Rules is not commonly exercised to allow periods of temporary release for prisoners to attend family occasions outside of the existing Prison Service temporary release schemes.

21.6. There is no benefit in refusing short periods of temporary release to prisoners who do not pose any risk of breaching conditions of temporary release. We submit that consideration should be given to granting temporary release for significant dates in the lives of prisoners’ children.

21.7. RPAG calls on the NIPS to consider extending the temporary release schemes available to prisoners with families and in particular those with children.

22. Accommodation

22.1. We are concerned in relation to the comments in the review which indicate the possibility of regime facilities being restricted in the event of there being more than 60 Republican prisoners at Maghaberry Gaol. We submit that every effort should be made to maintain a regime level that respects international standards and that does not discriminate against separated prisoners.

23. Equality

23.1. For the reasons stated above RPAG does not have any confidence in the suggestion made in the consultation document that the issues surrounding the regime available for Republican prisoners do not engage section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. RPAG calls on the NIPS to conduct a full Equality Impact Assessment in respect of the regime in conjunction with the Equality Commission and other international and national bodies to ensure that the review is compatible with Equality provisions of national and international law.

Republican Prisoners Action Group

 

Soldier of the Legion of the Rear Guard

Liam O Ruairc reviews Robert W White’s Ruairi Ó Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary, Indiana 2006, pp412, £18.99, ISBN:0253347084

The American sociologist, Robert W White, has finally published his long-awaited biography of Ruairi Ó Brádaigh. Since the 1950s, Ó Brádaigh (born1932) has played a key role within Irish republicanism. He joined the IRA and Sinn Féin in the 1950s and became a major figure in each. He was on the IRA army council for decades and until 1983 was the president of Provisional Sinn Féin. Today Ó Brádaigh is usually presented as the president of the small ‘dissident’ party, Republican Sinn Féin, which is supposed to have ‘split’ from Provisional Sinn Féin in 1986.

Ó Brádaigh is a traditional republican who is no more a ‘dissident’ than Cathal Brugha was an ‘irregular’ in 1922. He claims to be the president not of a ‘splinter group’ but of the same Sinn Féin formed by Arthur Griffith and subsequently abandoned by Griffith himself, Eamon de Valera, Seán MacBride, Tomás Mac Giolla and Gerry Adams, who all broke the party’s constitution and rules. To take the most recent example, according to section 1b of the Sinn Féin constitution in 1986, proposals supporting entry into Leinster House were banned. Before the Adams leadership put forward a motion to enter Leinster House, they needed to change section 1b by a majority vote. They did not do so, and thus broke the existing Sinn Féin constitution and rules.

Ruairi Ó Brádaigh says that he did not split and form a new party - he kept the old one intact (the word ‘Republican’ being added to emphasise the party’s beliefs). It was Adams and the others who broke away from Sinn Féin, not him. In 1969-70, as in 1986, the constitutions of both the IRA and Sinn Féin had been breached; and Ó Brádaigh formed a provisional caretaker executive upholding the existing Sinn Féin constitution. Most of those who served in the first Provisional army council and party executive followed Ó Brádaigh in 1986. For Ó Brádaigh, “No splits or splinters - long may it remain so, provided we stick to basic principles” (p293). But when it comes to rules and principles being ignored, “the minority is going to expel the majority”, as he puts it (p151).

The treatyites in 1922, Fianna Fáil in 1926 and Clann na Poblachta in 1946 had at least the decency to leave the movement, keep it intact and form new constitutional parties, whereas in 1969-70 and 1986 the Adams leadership attempted to convert the organisation into something that was contrary to its nature.

More controversially, Ó Brádaigh does not simply claim to represent the authentic republican movement: his organisation also claims to be the actual legitimate government of Ireland, and that the six-county and 26-county parliaments are “illegal assemblies” of illegitimate states. To be a republican is not simply to be for a British withdrawal or for Irish unity - at best that makes one an Irish nationalist. To be a traditional republican is to declare one’s allegiance to and recognise “no other law” than that of the 32-county Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916, mandated by the democratic majority vote of the people in the 1918 elections, established by the First and Second Dáil, overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the 26 and six-county states. The republic is not an aspiration, but a reality.

In 1938, the remaining members of the First and Second Dáil delegated their powers to the army council of the IRA, making it the de jure government of Ireland. For most people this will be very difficult to take. But it is gives Ó Brádaigh’s position a coherence that most of his critics lack. “The IRA had for years killed people in defence of the republic. If it was the de jure government of the republic, then it had the legal right to defend it. If it was not the de jure government, then in whose name did it kill? And at what point did that killing become murder?” (p137).

Critics such as Martin Mansergh who attack Ó Brádaigh for his ‘legitimist’ and ‘legalist’ positions will constantly run into contradictions and incoherences. If Leinster House is not an “illegal assembly”, at what point and why did it become legitimate? This is a difficult question for Ó Brádaigh’s critics to answer. De Valera, the founder of Mansergh’s party, led a war against Leinster House, and only joined its system with the intent to overthrow it. If Leinster House is legitimate because a majority accepts it, then why not Stormont as well? And why not accept the treaty in the first place? If an all-Ireland referendum of the people acting as a unit is to be rejected as an act of “coercitive majoritarianism” against unionists, why do Mansergh et al not reject the 1918 elections? When do historical facts cease to become facts? If Mansergh et al’s incoherences are the alternative, then Ó Brádaigh’s “betrayal of the living Dáil” seems highly reasonable and far from ridiculous.

One of Ruairi Ó Brádaigh’s core political principles is non-recognition of and abstention from participation in the partitionist parliaments of Leinster House, Stormont and Westminster: “The central tension in the republican movement since 1921 has been whether or not the ‘republic’ can be achieved through parliamentary politics. The issue split the movement in 1922, 1926, 1946, 1969-70 and 1986. Ó Brádaigh consistently, firmly, places himself among those who believe that involvement in constitutional politics will divert the Irish republican movement into reform, not revolution” (p337). Ó Brádaigh argues that one cannot ride a horse going in two opposite directions. Revolutionary politics and constitutionalism are incompatible.

However, White’s treatment of abstentionism is slightly too theoretical. Ó Brádaigh’s fundamental point is this: “How can we claim to be a revolutionary organisation if we take part in the institutions of the state which we oppose?” (p298). If one does take part, this will give rise to a deep inconsistencies. For example, when Official Sinn Féin registered as a political party in the 26 counties in April 1971, Ó Brádaigh commented: “It is laughable that the Mac Giolla group, who are supposed to be opposed to the machinery of this state and want to tear it down, are using the same machinery to get registration as a party” (p166).

There is a fundamental contradiction between accepting the legitimacy of a state, of its laws and institutions, the constitutional system and the rules of parliamentarism and agreeing to operate within their framework; and armed insurrectionary politics dedicated to overthrow them. One cannot accept that the state has the monopoly of legitimate force and at the same time have links to an illegal army refusing to recognise the legitimacy of two governments and ready to kill the servants of both. This generates a problem of divided loyalty which will lead to tensions and inconsistencies; particularly so in regards to the armed forces of the state - notably illustrated in the case of the 1996 killing of Garda McCabe. It is inevitable that either one or the other will have to be chosen.

In 1986, when dropping abstentionism, the Provisionals promised: “If there is, by some unforeseen chance, a clash between them [the gardai] and the IRA, our public position in Leinster House on such a clash would be the same public position had we never crossed the floor” (An Phoblacht/Republican News November 6 1986). At the same time the Provisional army stated: “IRA no threat to the 26 counties” (An Phoblacht/Republican News December 3 1987). However, in a 2002 television interview, Adams stated that the Irish army and the gardai were the only legitimate armed forces: “We are very, very clear in terms of our recognition and acceptance and support for the Garda Siochána as the only legitimate policing service in the state and also in terms of the legitimacy of the defence forces” (RTE This Week February 24 2002).

As to going into the state to overthrow the state, historical experience shows that it is the system that transforms revolutionaries rather than vice versa. Michael Collins, Eamon de Valera, Sean Mac Bride, Cathal Goulding or Gerry Adams might not be insincere or corrupt individuals, but they all became part of the system they originally opposed. More seriously, former revolutionaries, once in the state machine, will not hesitate to turn on their former comrades who questioned their choices. The executions by the pro-treaty government, Fianna Fáil’s willingness to intern, execute and let IRA members die on hunger strikes, the Official Sinn Féin/Workers Party support for extradition and the supergrass system, the Provos’ intimidation and occasional murder of opponents all prove this point.

The book shows that Ruairi Ó Brádaigh is a republican traditionalist, but that does not mean he is a militarist extremist, hostile to peace and incapable of either pragmatism or compromise. Conor Cruise O’Brien himself noted that Ó Brádaigh seemed “more interested in preventing violence than in starting it” (p160). He is not against ceasefires - he ended the 1956-62 campaign, for example. Ó Brádaigh was involved in peace negotiations since the early 1970s - ‘peace’ was not an innovation of the Adams leadership. He was ready to offer honourable compromises to unionists on a number of occasions. Far from trying to bomb a million protestants into a ‘united Ireland’, as early as 1972 he appealed to the unionists: “Let us repeat once more: we do not wish to submerge the unionists of the north east in an all-Ireland state … We would never ask you to join the 26-county state - we are trying to escape from it ourselves!” (p194).

In Ó Brádaigh’s analysis, a unitary state and rule from Dublin are part of the problem, not part of the solution. Ireland suffers from a triple minority problem: the Irish-speaking minorities in the west of Ireland, the nationalists in the north, and the unionists in Ireland as a whole. Ó Brádaigh was instrumental in getting the republican movement to propose a federal solution to this triple minority problem to guarantee minority rights and prevent regional disparities. Ó Brádaigh highly regards the Swiss federal system for its ability to safeguard the rights of different national and linguistic groups. The book reminds us that sections of unionism and loyalism in the 1970s gave serious consideration to federal proposals. If the British state was to withdraw and rule from Dublin is unacceptable and an independent Northern Ireland unviable, a federal Ireland with a new capital in Athlone could provide the basis of an acceptable compromise.

The federal policy was later denounced by the Adams leadership as a “sop to loyalists”. They wanted a unitary state dominated by nationalists (p284). Ó Brádaigh’s democratic proposals now sound refreshing, given the ‘numberism’ of those people who now claim that their united Ireland will be come about through ‘outbreeding’ the protestants in the north.

The book challenges a number of commonly held mistaken ideas. It refutes the myth that the movement was headed by some ‘southern’ leadership, out of touch with northern realities. Throughout most of the 1970s, the IRA leadership was national in scope, with representation from both sides of the border. It included people like Billy McKee, Leo Martin, Seamus Twomey and Joe Cahill - all from Belfast. Southern representatives such as Sean Mac Stiofain and Dáithí Ó Conaill tried to tour and meet with northern units on a regular basis (pp203-05). It is thus inaccurate to claim that it was a ‘southern’ leadership that had negotiated the 1975 truce, given seven out of eight representatives of the ‘political and military leadership of the republican movement’ in the negotiations came from the north (pp222, 254-55).

The biography questions the perception that the 1975 truce had been “disastrous”. The British were then talking about ‘structures of disengagement’ from Ireland (p235): “Beginning in January 1975, the British sent signals that they were considering a withdrawal - whether or not the British representatives were purposely or accidentally sending those signals, they were real” (p246). Ó Brádaigh does not remember people back in 1975 expressing concerns either about the handling of the truce or any domination by people from the south. It is only from 1986 that history was rewritten and that the 1975 truce was officially labelled “disastrous” (p307).

White also challenges the idea that there were no politics before Adams and that the movement was pursuing a “monomilitary strategy” in the 1970s. In fact, under Ó Brádaigh the republican movement had always been more than just ‘Brits out’. For example, commentators attach much significance to Jimmy Drumm’s 1977 Bodenstown speech (written by Adams and Morrison) as signalling the ‘politicisation’ of the republican movement. Drumm stated that “a successful war of liberation cannot be fought exclusively on the back of the oppressed in the Six Counties” and that the “isolation” of Republicans around the ‘armed struggle’ was dangerous. The movement needed to develop “a positive tie-in with the mass of the Irish people”, and to do so required taking a stand “on economic issues and on the everyday struggles of the people”.

To present this as some ‘new departure’ is deeply misleading. As early as 1972, Ó Brádaigh was calling on republicans to be active in social and economic issues “so that Irish workers may experience at first hand our concern for their interests” and he warned that Sinn Féin was in danger of becoming only “a support group for the struggle in the north” (pp258-59). Similarly, the ideas expressed by Adams in his Brownie column were far from new. Ó Brádaigh had expressed similar ideas as far back as 1970 (pp257-5. As White concludes, “In the 1970s he had tried to keep politics relevant when almost everyone else, it seemed, focused on the IRA” (p274).

Under Ó Brádaigh, politics in the republican movement already existed: he was trying to combine armed struggle with revolutionary politics long before there was any talk of an ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy. What Adams introduced was not politics, but constitutional politics. The same goes for elections. Electoral tactics were nothing new and elections had been used to advance the struggle for decades. Ó Brádaigh himself had been elected as an abstentionist TD in the 1950s. What Adams introduced was electoralism: that is, the use of the struggle to advance electoral gains.

The book undermines the perception that Ó Brádaigh is conservative and rightwing. He totally accepted the leftward politicisation of the republican movement by Cathal Goulding and others in the 1960s and by Adams and others in the late 1970s - as long as it did not threaten abstentionism. He considers himself to be a socialist, but argues that socialism cannot be achieved by going into parliamentary institutions that maintain the capitalist system. Cathal Goulding himself noted that among the founders of the Provisionals were some “good revolutionaries and good socialists” who disagreed with parliamentary participation (p370), and Adams described Ó Brádaigh as “quite liberal in his political outlook on social and economic matters”.

A downside of the book is that White does not try to assess the political weight of Ó Brádaigh or of the historical tradition he comes from; and whether or not they have any future. Republican Sinn Féin is a marginal organisation existing on the fringes of Irish politics. In 2004 it failed to get any local councillor elected in the south, and last year it lost its only (unofficial) seat in the north. But his organisation is more concerned about defending principles and upholding a historical tradition than in votes. Voters come and go, but maintaining the continuity of tradition is what is essential for Ó Brádaigh. The other parties that have withdrawn from the high ground of the republic towards the practical acceptance of partitionist institutions just consist of politicians looking for votes. For such parties, the choice is between compromise and irrelevancy, principles and power.

So where could the relevance of Ó Brádaigh’s politics lie? “It is not that he enjoys being a revolutionary or that he believes the road to the republic is easiest through the use of physical force and non-constitutional politics. It is a choice between guaranteed failure or the prospect that, at some point, a revolutionary situation - like the one that existed in the 1920s - will allow real transformation of political power in Ireland” (p342). It is in such a situation that Ó Brádaigh believes his organisation will become politically relevant.

But de Valera’s piecemeal reforms gave the 26 counties a status that eventually reconciled the vast majority of its citizens to the state, and the Belfast agreement addresses most of the material grievances which sustained Provisionalism, resulting in a growing social and political incorporation of the catholic working class into the six counties. On that basis it can be questionable whether there is any real space for a revolutionary situation or for Ó Brádaigh’s politics.

But that will not deter him. “If but few are faithful found, they must be all the more steadfast for being a few” (Terence MacSwiney). He will keep the flame alive as long as necessary.

(Published in the Weekly Worker, 20 July 2006)

 

Principles and Tactics

Liam O Ruairc • 16 July 2006
The Blanket

Last year, Irish journalist Kevin Rafter published an insightful book on Sinn Fein. (Kevin Rafter, Sinn Fein 1905-2005: In the Shadow of Gunmen, Dublin: Gill&Macmillan, 2005) Rafter’s fundamental thesis is that under the Adams leadership, the rule book of Irish republicanism was fundamentally rewritten, ideological purity was jettissoned in favour of electoral advancement:

The problem with Rafter’s characterisation is that it tends to confuse pragmatism and opportunism. Pragmatism is about temporarily setting aside a minor ideal to achieve some higher ideal. Opportunism is abandoning some important political principles in the process of trying to increase one’s political power and influence. With pragmatism, there is unity between means and ends; whereas with opportunism, political means have become ends in themselves and the orginal relation between means and ends is lost.

Just before Adams succeeded him as President of Sinn Fein, Ruairi O Bradaigh declared: "No splits or splinters -long may it remain so provided we stick by our basic principles." (APRN 17 Nov 83)

But those ‘basic principles’ are they really principles or are they just tactics? The question was not new. At its 1975 Ard Fheis, Sinn Fein debated the recognition of the courts: was it a tactic, or was it a principle? (AP, 7 November 1975) The confusion of principles and tactics opens the road to opportunism.

"The record of the Adams era shows that everything in the republican code is now a tactic…He has displayed a total disregard for traditional republican dogma and has refused to be hamstrung by historical principles like abstentionism and decommissioning…" (p.242)

Take the example of abstentionism. According to O Bradaigh: "Discussing going into Leinster House, Stormont or Westminster is as foreign and as alien as that the IRA would sit down and discuss surrender of arms." (APRN 17 Nov 83)

Rafter comments:

"In the mid-1980s, O Bradaigh may not have guessed at how accurate his crystal-ball gazing would be. But just over a decade later, Sinn Fein would indeed take seats in all but the Westminster parliament, while the IRA would sanction two acts of decommissioning before ordering an end to its armed campaign in July 2005." (p.122)

Dropping abstentionism in the context of Leinster House was sold as a tactic, however abstention from Stormont or Westminster grass roots were told, was a matter of principle.

Martin McGuiness then declared: ‘I can give a commitment on behalf of the leadership that we have absolutely no intention of going to Westminster or Stormont. (…) Our position is clear and it will never, never, never change. The war against British rule must continue until freedom is achieved. (…) We will lead you to the Republic.‘ (The Politics Of Revolution, The main speeches and debates from the 1986 Sinn Fein Ard-Fheis including the presidential address of Gerry Adams) Eight years later, the ‘war against British rule’ was over, and five years after that Martin McGuiness was a British Minister of Education in the Stormont assembly. This again was sold as a ‘tactic’.

Some time ago, Adams stated: "There will never, ever be Sinn Fein MPs sitting in the British Houses of Parliament." (House of Commons, SN/PC1667, p.17)

However, interestingly enough, in 2000, Mitchel McLaughlin claimed that his party was not in Westminster not because abstention from that institution was a fundamental Republican principle, but because ‘there was no strategic value in going to Westminster‘ (Gerald Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alientation to Participation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.228). Everything is now reduced to a ‘tactic’.

Tom Hartley argued twenty years ago that "There is a principle rising above all principles and that is the principle of success." (APRN 7 Nov 85) The movement is everything, principles nothing; or at least the movement and its growth come first, principles second.

In terms of international comparison, Rafter cannot find any other example of political movements who have gone so far in the dillution of their core principles:

"No other political party in Europe has undergone such a radical overhaul of its basic principles, not even the former communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe that transformed themselves into social democratic entities in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet bloc." (p.15)

More significantly, in an Irish context, there are no historical precedents of a Republican organisation going so far. Take for example the Provisional movement abandoning abstentionism from Stormont:

"It was a departure no previous republican had endorsed. Not even de Valera when he departed Sinn Fein in 1926 argued that republicans should end abstentionism in the context of parliamentary representation in Northern Ireland. The so-called compromisers in 1926, who re-emerged as Fianna Fail, and those in in the post-1970 Official movement who evolved into the Workers Party, broke ranks with republican dogma purely in the context of taking seats in Dail Eireann. The idea of republican representatives sitting in an assembly of a partitioned Northern Ireland was never an issue. In effect, with the 1998 decision, Adams moved his Sinn Fein organisation even further away from the party that called itself Sinn Fein after the 1921 Treaty split." (p.138)

The same goes for decommissioning. Even the hated ‘Sticks’ never decommissioned a single bullet of their arsenal…

Danny Morrison recently wrote some interesting reflections on principles and tactics:

"There are many republicans who feel that the IRA leadership went too far … I myself think that whilst there have been mistakes they got the balance just about right. But it has been a difficult road given that the armed struggle was waged - and could only have been waged - with idealistic zeal and for fundamental demands. Independence and a socialist Ireland are what Volunteers signed up for and for which many laid down their lives. We demanded a British withdrawal within the lifetime of a government. We demanded that Britain recognise the right of the Irish people as a unit to national self-determination. We demanded an amnesty for the political prisoners. And we fought one hell of a long struggle and paid a heavy price in pursuit of those demands. But there were many lessons learnt along the way. The exigencies of survival meant that republicans couldn’t allow themselves to be constrained by their principles. And so, the IRA began ‘recognising’ courts, particularly in the South where the unchallenged word of a garda superintendent was enough to imprison a Volunteer. Volunteers fought court cases, took the witness stand and refuted allegations of membership and IRA activity. In miscellaneous, political and quasi-political court cases republicans paid fines and some individuals - again quoting pragmatism, but against republican policy - pleaded guilty in court to minimise their sentences. After the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order was introduced in 1987, republican activists ‘filed’ for marches, albeit insulating themselves from direct dealings with the RUC through using solicitors. (…) Republicans have used the courts and judicial reviews to sue the state or compel unionists to obey equality laws. Purists will argue that this dilutes one’s republicanism - but purists rarely have anything to show for struggle and sacrifice. Life is complex, circumstances change, battles are won and lost, opportunities arise, and, as in nature, it is those who can adapt who survive and thrive. In fact, to use and exploit the system in a considered way, both in its contradictions or whatever advantages it offers to achieve one’s ultimate aims is often to do the revolutionary thing. And this, to me, is the story of the peace process, and the peace process to me is a phase of struggle." (Danny Morrison, "Paisley just a blip in the ongoing peace process", Daily Ireland, 9 February 2006)

The recognition of the courts is a matter of pragmatism. Abandoning ‘fundamental demands’ is an example of opportunism. Questions of principles become confused with questions of tactics. Presenting this as part of a ‘new phase of the struggle’ is simply a device to hide the Provisional movement’s strategic failure.